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Networks, Space and Organisational Performance: A Study of the Determinants of 
Industrial Research Income Generation by Universities 
Abstract 
This paper examines the extent to which both network structure and spatial factors impact on 
the organisational performance of universities as measured by the generation of industrial 
research income. Drawing on data concerning the interactions of universities in the UK with 
large R&D-intensive firms, the paper employs both social network analysis and regression 
analysis. The analysis finds that the structural position of a university within networks with 
large R&D-intensive firms is significantly associated with the level of research income 
gained from industry. Spatial factors, on the other hand, are not found to be clearly associated 
with performance, suggesting that universities operate on a level playing field across regional 
environments once other factors are controlled for. 
Keywords: university-industry links; networks; large R&D-intensive firms; knowledge 
transfer; regions; social network analysis; centrality. 
1. Introduction 
The rise of the knowledge-based economy has brought major changes in the position that 
universities are expected to occupy in our economies and societies. Universities have come to 
be regarded as key sources of knowledge utilisable in the pursuit of economic growth, with 
knowledge commercialisation and transfer activities attaining a more important role within 
universities (Etzkowitz, 2003; Drucker and Goldstein, 2007; Huggins et al., 2008; Kitson et 
al., 2009; Howells et., 2012). Many governments and their agencies are turning their attention 
to the role of knowledge transfer activities in developing innovative, sustainable, and 
prosperous economies and industries (Lawton Smith, 2007; Goddard et al., 2012; Hewitt-
Dundas, 2013; Hughes and Kitson, 2012). The growth of university-industry interactions and 
networks derives from the requirements of individual firms to source knowledge from 
external sources, which is increasingly recognised as a key factor within modern innovation 
processes (Chesbrough, 2003). This has led some to consider these networks to be a form of 
capital allowing firms access to economically beneficial knowledge (Huggins and Thompson, 
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2014) or a resource through which firms gain access to a range of intangible assets such as 
enhanced reputation (Lavie, 2006; Gulati, 2007). 
At the same time, universities have become compelled to pursue knowledge transfer 
activities for pecuniary reasons. Driven by reductions in government funding, as well as 
shrinking endowments and increased operating costs, university administrators and faculty 
have sought other sources of funding to cover their research costs in the form of third stream 
activities such as services and contracts undertaken for private commercial organisations, 
which increasingly sit alongside more traditional sources such as funding from research 
councils (Siegel et al, 2007; Geuna and Muscio, 2009; Hewitt-Dundas, 2013). Studies show 
that such external funding, particularly funding by industry, has favourable impacts on the 
scientific performance of universities. Although several scholars have expressed concern 
regarding the potentially adverse effect of the growth of industrial funding upon the 
autonomy of university researchers and the quality of scientific production (Dasgupta and 
David, 1994), there is a growing body of evidence indicating that university researchers 
funded by industry are more productive than colleagues who are not in receipt of such 
funding (Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005). These studies suggest that industrial funding 
provides university researchers not only with additional financial resources but also relevant 
knowledge, generating synergistic effects on their scientific productivity, resulting in 
improved organisational performance (Manjarrés-Henríquez et al., 2009). 
In contrast, there is a dearth of evidence concerning the factors that facilitate 
universities in generating external income, particularly in the form of research grants and 
contracts. Although a growing body of work examining university knowledge transfer 
demonstrates that many institutions are developing initiatives designed to increase such 
activity (Abreu et al., 2008; Hewitt-Dundas, 2013), less is known about the nature and pattern 
of the interactions emerging from such knowledge transfer practices, and how such 
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interactions influence organisational performance as measured by the generation of external 
research income. 
The questions the paper addresses concern the nature of the network and spatial 
factors underlying the interactions that universities undertake with industry, and the 
subsequent influence of these factors on the generation of research income from industry. The 
paper explores whether or not a university’s ability to raise research income is associated 
with (1) its structural position within a wider network pattern of university-industry 
interactions, (2) the spatial reach of its interactions with firms, as well as (3) the nature of the 
regional environment in which it is located. Through the use of both social network analysis 
and regression analysis, the paper explores whether the network and spatial structure of the 
interactions of universities with large industrial R&D players is associated with research 
income generation from industry. In essence, the paper seeks to examine whether or not 
interactions with large R&D firms provide universities with access to resources that enhance 
future prospects for industrial funding generation. In other words, it explores the extent to 
which universities are able to exploit the type of network resources that others have argued 
are beneficial to the performance of organisations (Lavie, 2006; Gulati, 2007; Huggins and 
Thompson, 2014; 2015). 
The focus upon large industrial R&D performers as organisations with which 
universities interact is motivated by the fact that they are likely to be important sources of 
knowledge and other network resources for universities, as they constitute a large proportion 
of the knowledge and innovation capacity of many major economies such as the UK 
(Bercovitz and Feldman, 2007; D’Este and Patel, 2007; Hewitt-Dundas, 2011; Huggins et al., 
2012). Given the strategic importance of externally generated income to both the scientific 
productivity and financial viability of universities, the paper contributes to the literature 
concerning the role of universities in the knowledge-based economy. 
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To achieve these aims, the analysis utilises data from a unique database containing 
information on the knowledge-based interactions universities in the UK have with external 
organisations in the forms of collaborative research, contract research, and consultancy 
projects. Coupled with data on the largest private sector R&D performers in the UK, the 
database facilitates the matching of universities with leading R&D-intensive firms. Following 
a review of the substantive literature and the methodology underlying the empirical analysis, 
the paper first presents a social network analysis of the key interactions taking place between 
universities and these leading firms. Regression analysis is used to examine, along with other 
related factors, the extent to which these interactions are related to the capability of 
universities to raise research income from industry. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
the findings and their implications. 
2. Theoretical and Empirical Context 
Building upon the research questions presented above, this section initially provides a review 
of the paper’s three key analytical concepts: network position; regional environment; and 
spatial distance between interacting parties. Each concept is considered with regard to the 
literature concerning university-industry interactions and their potential capability to explain 
rates of industrial research income generation by universities. The last part of the section 
provides further contextual details of university funding in the UK. 
An understanding of the performance of organisations, such as firms and universities, 
has made significant advances in recent years through studies of the networks in which those 
organisations are embedded. In particular, it has been argued that the network space occupied 
by actors, defined by the nature of the relationships, interactions, and ties, may be equally, if 
not more important, than the geographic space within which actors are located and interact 
(Huggins and Thompson, 2014). The network space of actors—be it firms or universities—
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can be usefully analysed by studying their position within a particular network structure 
through the use of social network analysis techniques. Social network analysis, as developed 
by sociologists, maintains a key behavioural assumption that any actor typically participates 
in a social system involving other actors who are significant reference points in decision-
making (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982). The nature of the relationships a given actor has with 
other system members may, therefore, affect the focal actor’s actions. In recent years, social 
network analysis has been increasingly applied to examinations of the flow of knowledge 
across organisations and the knowledge networks these organisations utilise to facilitate 
innovation (Fleming et al, 2007; Schilling and Phelps 2007; Varga and Parag, 2009). 
Some scholarly research suggests that the nature of networks is related to underlying 
patterns of knowledge flow (van Wijik et al., 2008). The position of an actor within networks 
is found to be correlated with relative power, which refers to a set of resources that the actor 
(could) mobilise through its existing set of relationships, in this case: knowledge (Mizruchi 
and Galaskiewicz, 1994). At the individual level, these resources are usually considered to 
take the form of social capital, consisting of the benefits accruing from interpersonal 
networks (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000). At the organisational level, however, such 
resources are considered to be a form of network capital, consisting of the benefits accruing 
from inter-organisational networks (Kramera and Revilla Diez, 2012; Huggins and 
Thompson, 2014; 2015). However, there are few studies that have applied the concept in an 
empirical manner with regard to examining links between universities and industry. 
The nature of the relationships a given actor has with other network members is 
expressed by various measures in social network analysis, with centrality measures ranking 
actors in terms of their relevance due to their position in a network. As will be detailed later 
in the section of data and methods, the analysis focuses on two aspects of the centrality a 
focal university has within university-industry networks: ‘degree centrality’ and ‘eigenvector 
6 
 
centrality’. ‘Degree centrality’ refers to the number of actors a focal actor is directly 
connected to, and measures the rate of the involvement of the actor in the network (Freeman, 
1978). ‘Eigenvector centrality’ assumes that a focal actor’s status is a function of the status of 
those other actors to which the focal actor is connected, meaning that, in a communication 
network, the amount of information available to an actor is positively related to the amount of 
information available to those other actors with which it is connected (Bonacich, 1987). In 
the context of the analysis, the former—degree centrality—denotes the number of large 
R&D-intensive firms a university in question interacts with, whereas the latter—eigenvector 
centrality—measures the number of other universities to which each of the large R&D-
intensive firms is linked. Employing a composite of the two complementary measures of 
network centrality, as well as the degree centrality measure as a baseline comparator, the 
analysis assesses a university’s power to mobilise resources within university-industry 
networks (Bonacich, 1987). 
 Aside from the network positions, scholars have long been interested in the effect of 
location on a range of economic activities, specifically focusing on the factors that make a 
region ‘competitive’ (Kitson et al., 2004). Competitive regions generally have a higher 
number of knowledge-based firms as well as higher levels of R&D expenditures, and are 
typically populated by research intensive universities engaged in world leading research 
(Howells et al., 2012; Huggins et al., 2012). In contrast, uncompetitive regions tend to be 
organisationally and institutionally ‘thin’, with a lack of innovation-driven public or private 
sector entities (Ponds et al., 2007; Huggins and Thompson, 2014). 
Universities in economically core regions may possess locational advantages related 
to the generation of research income based on their spatial proximity to a greater pool of large 
R&D players, as well as the additional effects stemming from more competitive 
environments. Spatial proximity is potentially an important factor in accessing knowledge 
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from a source and forging links to it (Ponds et al., 2007; 2010). This may be especially 
important with respect to more tacit forms of knowledge where a shared ‘codebook’, or 
language and customs (Cowan et al., 2000), and the existence of a trusting relationship 
between parties (Wood and Parr, 2005) facilitate the transfer and absorption of knowledge 
from one source to another. Extant research on university-industry interaction has produced 
some evidence suggesting that the co-location of research intensive firms and universities in 
the same region facilitates the interactions leading to innovative collaboration (Bouba-Olga et 
al., 2012; D’Este et al., 2013). Given the current evidence base, it can be suggested that 
universities located in core regions with greater pools of large R&D-intensive firms may have 
better opportunities to forge links with large R&D players than their counterparts in more 
peripheral regions. Furthermore, universities located in core regions may benefit from 
additional regional effects, such as the greater availability of insider information due to 
environments conducive to spillovers, more intensive competition among local universities in 
winning research grants and contracts, and a greater accumulation of experience at ‘winner’ 
institutions. 
A further geographical factor to consider is the spatial reach of knowledge sourcing 
activity (D’Este and Iammarino, 2010; Laursen et al., 2011; Huggins et al., 2012; Bouba-
Olga et al., 2012; D’Este et al., 2013). Despite the role of spatial proximity, not all knowledge 
is acquired from geographically proximate areas. As non-proximate actors become better able 
to transfer complex knowledge across spatial boundaries, the constraining effect of distance 
on knowledge flow may be gradually diminishing (Tracey and Clark, 2003). Rising levels of 
national and transnational academic-industry partnerships demonstrate that neither firms nor 
universities consider knowledge flows to be necessarily spatially constrained (Huggins et al., 
2008). Given this trend, universities interacting with large R&D players at longer distances 
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may improve their reputation and earn big-ticket research contracts, compared with 
universities for which interactions with industry are spatially limited. 
Returning to the issue of research income generation, income from industry represents 
a relatively small but potentially significant source of research grants and contracts. 
According to the 2010–11 Higher Education – Business and Community Interaction Survey, 
the research grants and contracts awarded by UK industry, commerce, and public 
corporations account for 8.3% of the total university research income from domestic sources. 
Although the amount may appear relatively low, the proportion increases if the public match-
funding provided for many industrial projects are included, with Behrens and Gray (2001) 
estimating that industrial funding directly influences approximately 20–25 per cent of 
research funding at universities. Therefore, industrial funding has become a significant driver 
of university performance in the knowledge-based economy. 
3. Data and Methods 
The data collected and methods of analysis employed by the study are outlined below. 
Data 
To construct a sample dataset for this investigation, information was collected from the 
following three key sources: (1) a unique database of almost 10,000 firms and organisations 
interacting with UK universities between 2005 and 2008 via knowledge transfer activities; (2) 
the 2008 R&D Scoreboard published jointly by the Department for Innovation, Universities 
& Skills (DIUS) and the Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (BERR), 
which consists of two R&D rankings: the Top 850 UK companies; and the Top 1400 Global 
companies by R&D investment (both of which provide financial data on these R&D firms); 
and (3) HEFCE’s (Higher Education Funding Council for England) HE-BCI (Higher 
9 
 
Education – Business and Community Interaction) survey data on UK universities and 
HESA’s (Higher Education Statistics Agency) data covering university financial accounts for 
various years. 
The database of interactions consists of information gathered from an analysis of 
research and annual reports published by universities (Appendix Table 1 in the supplemental 
file provides an indication of the initial data capture process based on an example of ten 
identified interactions). For each university in the UK, a review of these reports was 
undertaken for the 3-year period of 2005–08. For this period, the research team recorded the 
details of any active interactions with industry in the forms of collaborative research, contract 
research, or consultancy projects. The definitions for each type of interaction are those 
commonly utilised by the higher education sector, namely: (1) collaborative research 
referring to academic research undertaken in partnership with other organisations; (2) 
contract research denoting a transaction involving the provision of university research to an 
external partner; and (3) consultancy meaning application of existing knowledge in the form 
of advice or work to an outside party. 
For each case of interaction, the name of an organisation interacting with a university 
was noted along with any other information about characteristics of the interacting 
organisation, distinguishing private-sector firms from other types of organisations. Following 
this, the research team mined a number of business databases to obtain further details of each 
private-sector firm such as business size, location, and sector of activity. This principally 
consisted of the FAME database, supplemented by a range of other commercial business 
information databases. Importantly, the location of the interacting firm was confirmed or 
identified through this process. In a very small number of cases where firms operated across 
multiple sites, and where it was not possible to identify the location of a relevant 
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establishment from university documentation, the address of the firm’s UK headquarters was 
utilised. 
A comparison of this dataset of firms with the top R&D spending firms listed in the 
2008 R&D Scoreboard of DIUS/BERR identified a total of 504 large R&D-intensive firms, 
which were common across both sources, and a total of 1,460 interactions. 1  The 504 
identified firms represent a cross-section of 32 industrial sectors headed by (1) 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology (13.9% of firms); (2) electronic and electrical equipment 
(10.3%); and (3) technology hardware and equipment (9.9%) (Appendix Table 2 in the 
supplemental file presents the number of interactions by the location of universities at the 
regional level). A test of representativeness indicates that the sectoral distribution of 
interacting firms in the sample is significantly correlated with the distribution of all firms on 
the two R&D rankings by DIUS/BERR. 
The dataset distinguishes the number of interactions each university has with large 
R&D firms and the connectivity of those interacting firms with other universities, making it 
possible to examine whether any effects arise from a university’s network position. Clearly, 
the social network analysis stemming from this data could include other interactions such as 
firm-to-firm and university-to-university links. However, as seminal proponents of such 
analysis have made clear, the ‘total network’ of any community stretches within and beyond 
any imposed boundaries, and it is always advisable to identify a particular segment, or 
‘partial network’, that is the focus of analytical attention (Mitchell, 1969; Scott, 2000). Only 
thorough the study of partial networks and particular relationships can content and meaning 
become clear (Mitchell, 1969), and in this case the focus of attention principally concerns the 
question of whether the networks formed by universities with large R&D-intensive firms 
impact on their performance in terms of generating research income from industry. Therefore, 
it makes methodological sense to concentrate on these particular university-industry links. 
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Nevertheless, the edge and boundary effects this imposes on the analysis is acknowledged, as 
this is the case with any social network analysis whereby fixed boundaries are required to be 
enforced to aid meaningful study (Hunter et al., 2008). 
 
Analytical Framework  
Based on the data outlined above, the analysis focuses on the network of interactions between 
UK universities and large R&D-intensive firms, using social network analysis software 
(Pajek 1.24) as a means of measuring the networks with social network indicators as well as 
graphically representing the interactions between universities and firms. This is followed by 
regression analysis in which a university’s externally generated industrial research income 
from UK industry is regressed on a set of explanatory variables, including variables 
stemming from the social network analysis. The regressors employed are divided into the 
following three groups: a university’s internal characteristics; its regional environment; and 
its interactions with large R&D-intensive firms. Descriptions of the dependent and 
independent variables are provided below. 
Research grants and contracts – The dependent variable is the amount of income a university 
earns from research grants and contracts from UK industry. The period covered in the 
analysis includes three academic years, 2008–09, 2009–10, and 2010–11. The period of the 
dependent variable assumes that there is some lapse between a university’s bids for research 
contracts and its undertaking of research services as recorded in its financial accounts. The 
aim is to analyse whether a university’s interactions with large R&D-intensive firms in the 
2005–08 period affects a university in attracting industrial research contracts, as recorded in 
the university’s financial accounts for contracts awarded and undertaken in the period of 
2008–11, with a view to dealing with an issue of endogeneity (which will be discussed in the 
section on model estimation). Since part of the industrial research income is expected to 
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derive from multi-year contracts, some of the contracts that record research income in the 
period of 2008–11, and particularly in its earlier years, may have started in the period of 
2005–08. To reduce the influence of potential overlapping, a weighted average for 2008–09, 
2009–10, and 2010–11 is tested with larger weights given to more recent years (i.e., 1, 2, and 
3 to 2008–09, 2009–10, and 2010–11 respectively), as well as a mean average of the three 
years. Taking averages over the period aims to reduce fluctuations in industrial research 
income over years, which are particularly large for universities generating relatively small 
amounts of research income. 
University internal characteristics – It is clearly important to understand how the internal 
resources of universities impact upon the research income earned. Employment measures are 
often used as a control for size (e.g., Segarra-Blasco and Arauza-Carod, 2008; Tether and 
Tajar, 2008), and in this case the analysis utilises a university’s full-time equivalent (FTE) 
employment in 2005–06. As is often utilised to capture the effects of increasing difficulties in 
control and coordination related to the growing size of an organisation, a quadratic term is 
added. Another variable that may play a role in explaining university research income 
generation is the portfolio of active patents in 2005–06, which is a proxy for a university’s 
stock of knowledge that may prove to be of commercial value, and the capacity of a 
university’s technology transfer/support office. Although it is a reasonably reliable measure 
of innovative output/activity (Rondé and Hussler, 2005; Tappeiner et al., 2008), it is 
recognised that patent activity is an imperfect measure since, for example, not all university 
research is codified into patents and may manifest itself through other forms of knowledge 
commercialisation (Fritsch and Slavtchev, 2007). 
 To specify a university’s distinct character, and to an extent, its research or teaching 
orientation, universities are classified into three groups by first distinguishing ‘old’—
representing traditional research-focused universities (so called pre-1992 institutions)—and 
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‘new’—representing the former polytechnics and teaching colleges (so-called post-1992 
institutions), and then dividing ‘old’ institutions into those affiliated with the Russell Group, 
which are generally regarded as the most prestigious group of UK universities, and those 
which are not. Accordingly, a set of two dummy variables are constructed, one for ‘old’ 
universities affiliated with the Russell Group and the other for ‘old’ universities not affiliated 
with Russell Group, using ‘new’ universities as the baseline. Furthermore, as there are 
significant variations across academic disciplines in the amount of research contracts and 
funding (Perkmann et al., 2011), with universities specialised in medical research/education 
showing a tendency to earn a higher amount of research income per staff member, a dummy 
for medical specialisation is also included.2 
Regional environment – Proximity to an agglomeration of highly intensive R&D firms may 
have an impact on university income generation. To discern this clustering effect, a variable 
is constructed to measure the number of highly intensive R&D firms in the dataset that are 
located within a university’s own region, defined by UK NUTS-1 regions. In a similar vein, 
another variable is constructed representing the aggregated regional amount of R&D 
investment made by interacting firms in the sample, representing the size of R&D in each of 
the 12 UK NUTS-1 regions that is potentially available to local universities. Also, the 
analysis includes a set of 11 dummies, each of which corresponds to a respective UK NUTS-
1 region, with a view to better discerning differentiated environments across the 12 UK 
NUTS-1 regions. As a baseline for the 11 regional dummies, South East England is chosen, 
since the region shows the highest concentration of highly intensive R&D firms in terms of 
both their number and their R&D investment. 
University interactions with large R&D-intensive firms – Four variables representing a 
university’s interactions with large R&D-intensive firms are tested. The first is the number of 
interactions a university has with large R&D-intensive firms, which represents the 
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university’s ‘degree centrality’ within university-industry networks. The second is the sum of 
R&D expenditures made by the firms with which the university interacts. 
 The third is a university’s network position measured in terms of a composite of 
degree centrality and eigenvector centrality. To create such a composite, Burt’s (1992) 
measure of constraint is employed, alternatively called structural holes, which was originally 
designed to measure the degree to which an actor is constrained from accessing non-
redundant sources of information. Within the measure of constraint construct, the extent to 
which actor i ’s network is directly or indirectly invested in a relationship with contact j  is 
given by: 
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p  and ija  is the value of the link from i  to j . For the dataset of 
interactions between universities and large R&D firms, aaij = (constant) for any i  and j . 
The sum of ijc , ∑=
j
iji cC , gives the value of Burt’s constraint measure for actor i . The 
variable is greater than zero, and is equal to one when an actor i  is isolated or linked to only 
one actor. 
 When applied to the dataset of university-industry interactions, Burt’s constraint 
measure is seen as a composite of two aspects of centrality—‘degree centrality’ and 
‘eigenvector centrality’—and thus distinct from the number of interactions a university has 
with large R&D-intensive firms, as represented by ‘degree centrality’ alone. Within Burt’s 
constraint measure, 
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Since the dataset of university-firm interactions does not include any university-to-university 
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interactions or firm-to-firm interactions, and the first component ijp  concerns the university 
in question (university i ) and firms it interacts with alone, not including any other 
universities, its value declines as the number of firms university i  interacts with increases. 
This component can be seen to represent degree centrality, which measures the number of 
actors a focal actor is directly connected to. 
The second component ∑
≠≠ jkik
kjik pp
,
 is determined by the connectivity of firms the 
university in question interacts with. For a given university i , nodes k  and j  represent the 
firms it interacts with and any other universities those firms interact with, respectively. This 
component takes a value of zero when these firms do not interact with any universities other 
than the university in question (university i ). For each of the firms (expressed as node k  in 
the formula), if it interacts with any other university, the component takes a positive value. 
The value of this component declines as those firms interact with a greater number of other 
universities, and asymptotically approaches the value of zero (which is taken when the firms 
are linked exclusively with the focal university, i.e., the focal university monopolises access 
to the intellectual assets of the firms). Thus, this component can be seen as a proxy for 
eigenvector centrality, a measure of how well-connected those firms with which the focal 
university interacts are to other universities. 
 Accordingly, Burt’s constraint measure can be seen as a composite of two types of 
centrality: the centrality in terms of the number of large R&D-intensive firms the focal 
university interacts with, and the centrality in terms of the status of those firms measured by 
the number of other universities they interact with (see Appendix Figure 2 in the 
supplemental file for an illustration of this). A lower value for Burt’s constraint measure 
implies a higher degree of this composite centrality, and therefore a negative association is 
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expected for the relationship between the research income universities gain from industry and 
their composite centrality indicator. 
 Finally, the average physical distance between the location of a university and each of 
the firms it interacts with outside its own region (expressed in thousand miles) is included as 
the fourth variable. Whilst the variables for regional environment aim to capture the potential 
clustering effect of highly intensive R&D firms within a university’s own region, this 
variable is seen as a proxy for a university’s geographical reach with large R&D-intensive 
firms. The variable is constructed using information on the postcodes of the university’s main 
campus and the firm’s branch/office where an interaction is recorded (descriptive statistics 
for the dependent and independent variables that are reported in the ensuing section of 
empirical results are provided in Appendix Table 3 of the supplemental file). 
 
Model estimation and further considerations 
The model for the regression analysis is expressed as: 
iiiiii uINCOMEINCOME ++++= − λ,1γINTβREGαUNI  
where iINCOME  is the average research income earned by university i  from industry in 
the UK in academic years 2008–09, 2009–10, and 2010–11. As noted earlier, a mean average 
was undertaken, as well as a weighted average, of the three years. iUNI , iREG , and iINT  
are vectors for the variables representing the university’s internal characteristics, regional 
environment, and interactions with firms, respectively; α , β , and γ  are vectors of the 
coefficients for each, and iu  is the error term. The values of the vectors iUNI , iREG , and 
iINT  are taken for the period 2005–06 or 2005–08, ensuring their precedence to 
undertaking research services for which income from industry is reported in the financial 
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accounts. The variables on the right hand side of the equation indicate the conditions at the 
time when a university considers making bids for particular research contracts, while the 
variable on the left hand represents their aggregated incomes reported in their financial 
accounts. The activities on both sides of the equation—preparation of a bid which may begin 
by obtaining insider information, and the undertaking of research services for the contract 
awarded—often take place with a lag. With the model’s structure, the aim is to shed light 
upon the knowledge and network assets of the industrial relationships a university 
continuously draws upon. 
Furthermore, iINCOME ,1−  is a lagged measure of industrial research income earned 
by university i , controlling for the unobserved heterogeneities of universities. Part of the 
research contracts generating research income in academic years 2008–09, 2009–10, and 
2010–11 are expected to derive from multi-year contracts that start earlier. To avoid an 
overlapping between the dependent variable and the lagged dependent variable in their 
contracts from which income is reported, an average of 2003–04 and 2004–05 for the lagged 
dependent variable is taken. Also, the analysis goes further back, testing an average for 1999–
2000 and 2000–01. Finally, λ  is a coefficient for iINCOME ,1− .  
Potential sources of endogeneity are mitigated in the estimation, with one such 
potential source being unobserved heterogeneities across universities. Such unobserved 
heterogeneities may affect iINCOME  and at the same time be correlated with explanatory 
variables, particularly those representing a university’s interactions with firms as well as its 
regional environment, producing biased estimates. The lagged dependent variable in the 
model iINCOME ,1−  is a proxy variable used to account for such unobserved factors, 
reducing the risk of this particular form of endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2010, pp. 70–71). 
Another unobserved factor potentially contained in the error term is the price for university 
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research services, which might be correlated with both iINCOME  and the university’s 
interactions with firms. However, the costs of researchers, a key production factor of 
university research services, are uniform across UK universities for given levels of researcher 
time. This makes the price for research services relating to particular specifications largely 
constant across universities, eliminating the possibility of it correlating with either 
iINCOME  or a university’s interactions with firms at the same time. 
Finally, another potential source of endogeneity is simultaneity between the 
dependent variable iINCOME  and a university’s interactions with firms. Meaning that, 
while iINCOME  is determined in the manner expressed by the above equation, the 
university’s interactions with firms is determined by iINCOME  and other factors, some of 
which are not present in the model. Again, this relationship is unlikely since it assumes that a 
university already knows future iINCOME  in 2008–11 before it enters collaborations with 
firms, which are either still active or completed during the period of 2005–08. Although 
universities often set targets for future research income, they do not necessarily achieve these 
goals due to uncertainties involved in the competitive bidding process for research contracts. 
For this reason, it is safe to say that simultaneity is not a serious problem. 
Revenues from research grants and contracts show a highly skewed distribution with a 
long right tail.3 In view of this, a generalised linear model with the gamma distribution is 
adopted. The gamma distribution is useful for modelling terms that are nonnegative and 
skewed toward larger positive values. Maximum likelihood estimates for coefficients of 
model variables are obtained by the Newton-Raphson algorithm with Fisher scoring (Gill, 
2001).  
4. Results 
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The overall university-industry network consists of those universities identified as 
collaborating with any of the large R&D firms during the period 2005–08 (see. Appendix 
Figure 2 in the supplemental file for a diagrammatic representation). If the most interlinked 
element of the network consisting of 16 universities is considered (Figure 1), it represents 
predominantly older and more prestigious institutions in the UK, covering 40.1% of all links. 
Measured by the composite indicator of degree centrality and eigenvector centrality discussed 
earlier, the University of Cambridge appears as the main hub, followed by Imperial College 
London and University College London. 
Figure 1 About Here 
The results of the regression analysis of the research income universities received from 
industry are presented in Table 1. Models 1 to 8 differ in terms of the variables representing a 
university’s interactions with large R&D-intensive firms, which include the number of large 
R&D-intensives firms a university interacts with (i.e., degree centrality), the sum of R&D 
expenditures made by the large R&D-intensives firms, the university’s composite indicator of 
degree centrality and eigenvector centrality, and the average crow-fly distance between the 
university and the large R&D-intensives firms it interacts with outside the university’s 
region. While each of the four variables is entered in turn into Models 1 to 4, Models 5 to 8 
include either the degree centrality indicator or the composite centrality indicator, together 
with the two other interaction variables. Furthermore, two variables controlling for regional 
environment—aggregated regional number of large R&D-intensive firms interacting with 
universities and the aggregated regional amount of their R&D expenditures—are entered in 
Models 1 to 6, whereas a set of regional dummies are entered in Models 7 and 8. As for the 
variables controlling for a university’s internal characteristics, all six variables are entered in 
Models 1 to 8. Table 1 shows the results for the mean average of industrial research income 
earned in 2008–09, 2009–10, and 2010–11 as the dependent variable. For the lagged 
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dependent variable controlling for the unobserved heterogeneities of universities, the mean 
average of industrial research income earned in 2003–04 and 2004–05 is used. 
Of the six variables controlling for a university’s internal characteristics, FTE 
employment, its quadratic term, a dummy for old universities not affiliated with Russell 
Group, and a dummy for medical specialisation enter the model at the 1% significance level 
through Models 1 to 8. While the coefficient for FTE employment takes a positive sign, its 
quadratic term enters the models with a negative sign, showing a decline in the marginal 
effect of the size of FTE employment upon research income. This may reflect growing 
difficulties in control and coordination within a university’s organisation as it increases in 
size. As for a university’s focus and esteem, a set of two dummies is employed to divide the 
sample into three mutually exclusive groups: old universities affiliated with the Russell 
Group, old universities not affiliated with the Russell Group, with new universities as a 
baseline. Whilst there is strong evidence that old universities not affiliated with the Russell 
Group earn higher research income than new universities, old universities affiliated with the 
Russell Group do not show any strong signs of earning higher research income than new 
universities when other variables, including FTE employment and the portfolio of active 
patents, are held constant.4 The dummy for specialisation in medical research and education 
enters all models significantly with a positive sign, indicating greater research income from 
industry. By contrast, a university’s portfolio of active patents shows no strong indication of a 
relationship with research income earned from industry. 
As for the variables controlling for a university’s regional environment, there are no 
strong indications that they impact upon a university’s research income generation from 
industry. In Models 1 to 6, neither of the two variables—the aggregated regional number of 
R&D-intensive firms interacting with universities and the aggregated regional amount of 
their R&D expenditures—is found significant. Also, each of them fails to enter Models 1 to 6 
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significantly when only one of them is entered (not reported in the table). A model that 
includes the six variables relating to a university’s internal characteristics without any 
variables representing its interactions with large R&D-intensive firms is also tested, finding 
that neither of the two variables representing regional environment enters the model 
significantly. 
Furthermore, in Models 7 and 8, a stronger test by adopting a set of 11 dummies is 
undertaken, each of which corresponds to a respective NUTS-1 region (other than South East 
England, which represents the baseline). With a greater degree of freedom lost, Models 7 and 
8 by definition have greater explanatory power as indicated by a smaller deviance statistic. 
The result shows that none of the regional dummies enters the models significantly. On the 
whole, there is no strong evidence that the clustering of highly R&D-intensive firms within a 
university’s own region (Models 1 to 6), or any unobserved heterogeneities of regional 
environment (Models 7 and 8), impacts upon a university’s ability to earn research income 
from industry. 
Four variables representing a university’s interactions with large R&D-intensive firms 
are tested—the number of interactions with large R&D-intensive firms (i.e., degree 
centrality), the sum of R&D expenditures made by the large R&D-intensive firms, the 
composite centrality measure consisting of degree centrality and eigenvector centrality, and 
the average crow-fly distance between the university and the large R&D-intensive firms it 
interacts with outside its own region. Of these, the number of interactions with large R&D-
intensive firms (which is the university’s degree centrality measure) and the sum of R&D 
expenditures made by the large R&D-intensive firms fail to significantly enter Models 1 and 
2 respectively. By contrast, the composite of degree centrality and eigenvector centrality 
enters Model 3 at the 1 % level with an expected negative sign, meaning that universities 
better situated within the university-industry network tend to generate a greater amount of 
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research income from industry. When this is compared with the result of Model 1, it is clear 
that while the degree centrality measure alone shows no strong relationship with a 
university’s industrial research income (Model 1), the composite of the two types of 
centrality—degree centrality and eigenvector centrality—is significantly related (Model 3). 
Model 4 examines the spatial reach of a university’s interactions with large R&D-
intensive firms outside its own region. Excluding firms within a university’s own region from 
consideration, this variable aims to evaluate whether spatial reach of interactions has any 
bearing upon its ability to earn research income from industry. The average crow-fly distance 
enters the model at the 1% significance level with a positive sign, meaning that the greater 
the average distance a university goes to forge a link with large R&D players, the greater 
research income it earns from industry. The sum of the crow-fly distances between a 
university and the firms it interacts with outside its region is also tested, which fails to show 
any significant relationship with industrial funding. When the degree centrality measure is 
entered together with the average crow-fly distance in Models 5 and 7, the average crow-fly 
distance remains significant at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. In contrast, when the 
composite centrality measure is entered together with the average crow-fly distance in 
Models 6 and 8, only the composite centrality measure enters the models significantly (at the 
5% level) with an expected negative sign. This means that when a university’s network 
position measured by the composite of degree centrality and eigenvector centrality is 
controlled for, the university’s spatial reach to large R&D-intensive firms shows no clear 
relationship with the amount of research income it earns from industry. 
In order to account for potential variations across industry sectors in terms of the size 
of the research contracts firms make with a university, two variables were constructed, 
representing the proportion of all interactions a university is engaged in with large R&D-
intensive firms operating in primary and tertiary (i.e., service) sectors, respectively. Again, 
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neither of the variables enters the models significantly, showing that the industrial sector of 
firms interacting with a university has no significant bearing upon industrial research income 
generation. 
Furthermore, Models 1 to 8 were tested with a weighted average of industrial research 
income earned in 2008–09, 2009–10, and 2010–11 (with weights of 1, 2, and 3 given to the 
three academic years respectively) as a dependent variable, obtaining the same key findings 
as discussed above. As a lagged dependent variable, an average of industrial research income 
for 1999–2000 and 2000–01, rather than an average for 2003–04 and 2004–05, were also 
tested with the same set of models. Again the key findings remain unchanged. 
Table 1 About Here 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The preceding results serve to highlight a number of key trends in terms of the association 
between the capability of universities to raise research income from industry and the network 
structure through which they interact with large R&D-intensive firms, as well as the nature of 
spatial environment in which these interactions takes place. Whilst it is clear that the specific 
characteristics of universities, particularly in terms of their size and type, such as research-
intensiveness, are of significant importance, it is also found that a university’s network 
position measured by a composite of degree centrality and eigenvector centrality is 
significantly associated with the amount of income earned from research grants and contracts 
with industry. 
When other factors are controlled for, universities with a greater number of links to 
firms that are in turn connected with a greater number of other universities are found to earn a 
greater amount of income from industrial research grants and contracts. It is also shown that a 
university’s connectivity with large R&D-intensive firms measured by degree centrality alone 
24 
 
shows no clear relationship with its performance in generating industrial research income. 
Clearly, therefore, the wider connectivity of the large R&D-intensive firms with which a 
university forges links is strongly related to research income generation, suggesting the 
importance of the reputation and status a university may enjoy, as well as the knowledge it 
acquires, through the networks it develops with industrial partners that are well connected to 
other universities. Therefore, it can be concluded that these connections do indeed act as 
network capital that is associated with university performance (Lavie, 2006; Gulati, 2007; 
Huggins and Thompson, 2014). 
 In contrast, there is no strong evidence to suggest an association between industrial 
funding and the other industrial interaction characteristics analysed. Neither the number of 
interactions a university has with large R&D players alone nor the R&D expenditures made 
by those firms shows any clear association with industrial research income. Furthermore, 
once the network position of a university measured by the composite of degree centrality and 
eigenvector centrality is controlled for, the spatial reach of interactions a university has with 
large R&D firms shows no clear relationship with industrial research income. Also, the 
regional environment, in terms of the clustering of large R&D-intensive firms, is not 
associated with industrial research income.  
The evidence suggests that, when the internal characteristics of universities and their 
interactions with industry are controlled for, there is generally a level playing field across 
regions even when any other unobserved regional characteristics are considered. Whilst 
spatial factors may play a role in determining the formation of university-industry links in the 
first instance, as suggested by other studies (Huggins et al., 2012; D’Este et al., 2013), they 
do not appear to influence the subsequent organisational performance of universities, as 
measured by their capability to earn industrial research income. Instead, it is the position 
universities hold within the networks formed with industry, along with their own particular 
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internal characteristics, that shows the most significant association with performance 
differentials. As Boschma and Ter Wal (2007) argue, success is not always a matter of being 
in the right place, but more about being a part of the right network. From a theoretical 
perspective, the findings indicate the importance of understanding and including the 
structural elements of networks within relational geographic analysis that is often focused on 
the local-global dimensions of such networks (Drejer and Lund Vinding, 2007). 
From the perspective of university administration and policymaking, it is probable 
that universities which are weakly positioned within wider networks of university-industry 
interactions lack the requisite number of knowledge brokers and gatekeepers to plan, forge, 
and manage links with large R&D-intensive firms (Harada, 2003). Such universities may fail 
to build positions within university-industry networks that allow them to generate research 
income from industry. This may call for policies aimed at assisting universities to connect 
with industry, especially the large R&D-intensive firms that are the focus of this study 
(Goddard et al., 2012; Hughes and Kitson, 2012). In a world of heightened competition 
across the university sector, it is likely that institutions will increasingly need to implement 
the forms of knowledge and network management practices that have become commonplace 
in the industrial sector. 
As for the potential limitations of the study, it is based on the known publicly 
available interactions between firms and universities. Of course, there may be a number of 
more private or informal relationships between universities and large R&D-intensive firms 
that would influence the results presented in this study. Also, universities interact with many 
more firms than just large R&D-intensive firms, and including these in future analysis may 
shed further light upon the nature of university-industry relationships and their impact. 
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1 Some of large R&D-intensive firms record interactions with universities at more than one 
establishment. In our social network analysis, those interactions are aggregated at the firm 
level. 
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2 Four universities are specialised in medical research and education, including Institute of 
Cancer Research, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, School of Pharmacy, and 
St George's Hospital Medical School. 
3 The values of skewness and kurtosis for the mean average of industrial research income 
earned in three academic years, 2008–09, 2009–10, and 2010–11 are 2.89 and 11.99 
respectively. For the weighted average, the statistics are 2.82 and 11.32. 
4 The mean average of active patents per FTE employee is 0.050, 0.030, and 0.005 for old 
universities affiliated with the Russell Group, old universities not affiliated with the Russell 
Group, and new universities respectively. 
 
 
Table 1: Results of generalised linear models: research income from industry 
Dependent variable: Research grants and contracts from industry (mean average of 2008–09, 2009–10, and 2010–11) 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 
FTE employment 1.390*** 1.411*** 1.100*** 1.217*** 1.200*** 1.055*** 1.416*** 1.251*** 
 (0.188) (0.192) (0.216) (0.199) (0.208) (0.217) (0.238) (0.253) 
(FTE employment)2 –0.108*** –0.109*** –0.082*** –0.090*** –0.090*** –0.077*** –0.108*** –0.093*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) 
Active patents 0.211 –0.023 0.328 –0.505 –0.639 –0.060 –1.140 –0.330 
 (1.274) (1.315) (1.211) (1.090) (1.247) (1.200) (1.316) (1.311) 
‘Old’ universities affiliated with 0.188 0.180 0.250 0.307 0.335 0.299 0.137 0.112 
Russell Group (0.565) (0.578) (0.581) (0.557) (0.593) (0.583) (0.640) (0.644) 
‘Old’ universities not affiliated with 1.199*** 1.225*** 1.230*** 1.241*** 1.235*** 1.238*** 1.220*** 1.225*** 
Russell Group (0.245) (0.250) (0.248) (0.242) (0.253) (0.247) (0.273) (0.274) 
Medical specialisation 1.787*** 1.806*** 1.864*** 1.794*** 1.906*** 1.877*** 1.985*** 2.006*** 
 (0.677) (0.694) (0.688) (0.681) (0.707) (0.696) (0.727) (0.742) 
Aggregated regional number of firms –0.006 –0.007 –0.010 –0.009 –0.010 –0.011 
interacting with universities (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Aggregated regional amount of R&D 0.004 0.007 0.012 0.017 0.018 0.016 
expenditures of firms interacting (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
East Midlands       –0.289 0.084 
       (0.561) (0.597) 
East of England       –0.056 0.047 
       (0.586) (0.598) 
London       –0.065 –0.133 
       (0.419) (0.433) 
North East       –0.371 –0.417 
       (0.714) (0.729) 
Northern Ireland       –0.307 0.045 
       (1.100) (1.122) 
North West       –0.128 –0.100 
       (0.530) (0.536) 
Scotland       0.392 0.787 
       (0.567) (0.620) 
South West       –0.548 –0.500 
       (0.517) (0.518) 
Wales       0.640 0.599 
       (0.552) (0.551) 
West Midlands       0.369 0.464 
       (0.528) (0.537) 
Yorkshire and the Humber       –0.369 –0.328 
       (0.536) (0.547) 
Degree centrality (number of  0.016    0.005  0.010 
interactions with firms) (0.012)    (0.022)  (0.024) 
R&D expenditures of firms interacting  0.022   0.012 –0.002 0.008 –0.007 
  (0.016)   (0.030) (0.018) (0.032) (0.021) 
Composite of degree centrality and eigenvector   –1.044***   –0.835**  –1.169** 
centrality (Burt’s measure of constraint)    (0.317)   (0.424)  (0.514) 
Average crow-fly distance with firms    4.050*** 3.835** 2.173 3.306* 0.241 
outside the university’s region    (1.506) (1.540) (1.639) (1.863) (2.295) 
Research grants and contracts from industry 0.108 0.132** 0.136** 0.167*** 0.136* 0.148** 0.134 0.150* 
(mean average of 2003–04 and 2004–05) (0.070) (0.065) (0.064) (0.063) (0.077) (0.068) (0.088) (0.081) 
Constant 3.708*** 3.731*** 4.772*** 3.494*** 3.535*** 4.436*** 3.046*** 4.169*** 
 (0.343) (0.349) (0.505) (0.343) (0.355) (0.597) (0.452) (0.679) 
Deviance 278.1 278.0 262.5 267.9 265.7 258.9 254.1 244.7 
Deviance/df 1.918 1.917 1.810 1.847 1.858 1.811 1.896 1.827 
AIC 14.343 14.342 14.242 14.277 14.289 14.245 14.330 14.270 
Notes: The gamma link function is used. * (**) (***) denote significance at the 10 (5) (1) percent levels respectively.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses ( ). Units of variables are shown in Appendix Table 3 with the exception of million £ for research income from industry (mean average 
of 2003–04 and 2004–05).  
 
 
Figure 1: The most interlinked element of the network  
 
 
Note: Kamada-Kawai’s free algorithm is used. 
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Appendix Table 1: Indicative details of the initial data capture process 
Name of 
University 
Name of 
Interacting 
Firm 
Type of 
Interaction 
Evidence/Extract Full Publication Details URL 
Cranfield 
University  
Nestlé Consultancy “Nestlé, one of the world’s largest food companies, 
turned to Cranfield for help as it moved into the 
production of flavoured waters. When creating any new 
product there are certain factors that manufacturers need 
to consider – the likely shelf-life, for example, and the 
sorts of problems likely to arise which may spoil the 
quality of the product and affect human health. And it is 
answers to these questions that Cranfield helped Nestlé 
predict. Cranfield scientists worked on determining the 
contamination-free shelf-life of the company’s new 
flavoured water products, especially with regard to heat-
resistant spoilage. They developed a novel ‘challenge 
test’ which could be used by Nestlé to make spoilage 
predictions when creating new formulations of drinks.” 
Cranfield University 
Annual Report “World 
Changing” 2008 
http://www.cranfield.ac.uk/a
nnualreport/annualreport_20
08.pdf 
Institute of 
Cancer 
Research  
Novartis Collaborative 
research 
“Commercial partners collaborating with The Institute 
and supporting clinical trials at The Royal Marsden 
during 2007 included Novartis, Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, 
Sareum, Bayer, Cougar, Elekta and Synarc.” 
Institute of Cancer 
Research Annual 
Research Report 2007 
http://www.icr.ac.uk/about_
us/annual_research_report/9
724.pdf 
Kingston 
University  
Pilkington Contract 
research 
“The European Commission and glass manufacturer 
NSG- Pilkington Group are funding a second study into 
how window panes respond to flames. When cracks 
occur during a house fire, backdraft can cause fire to 
develop rapidly, putting firefighters’ lives at risk. During 
the two-year programme, University specialists will help 
to design glass that is more heat resistant.” 
Kingston University 
London Annual Report 
2006-2007 
http://www.kingston.ac.uk/a
boutkingstonuniversity/facts
andfigures/annualreports/doc
uments/annual_report_0607.
PDF 
London 
South Bank 
University 
Rolls Royce Contract 
research 
“The research carried out by Professor Ezugwu and his 
team has enabled Rolls Royce to develop a capability 
that could lead to a 30-50 per cent reduction in 
manufacturing times and a five-fold improvement in 
consumable costs.” 
Services for business, 
Knowledge+innovation+
Success, London South 
Bank University (2005) 
http://www.lsbu.ac.uk/rbdo/
docs/S4BBrochure05(2).pdf 
North East 
Wales 
Institute of 
Ciba Specialty 
Chemicals 
Collaborative 
research 
“Polymeric additives to control the spraying and 
deposition of fluids. 
 
Materials Science 
Research Centre, Annual 
Research Report 06/07 
http://www.newi.ac.uk/en/A
cademicschools/ScienceTec
hnology/MaterialsScienceRe
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Higher 
Education 
EPSRC Cooperative Award in conjunction with Ciba 
Specialty Chemicals” 
(2006/7) searchCentre/TheFile,8861,e
n.pdf 
Queen Mary, 
University of 
London 
Airbus Collaborative 
research 
“Queen Mary already has established several strong 
collaborations with Chinese HEIs together with UK 
companies such as Airbus and QinetiQ in the fields of 
aerospace, clean energy, nano-technology, biometrics 
and security, wireless telecommunication and 
biotechnology.” 
Queen Mary, University 
of London Annual 
Review 2006 
http://www.qmul.ac.uk/abou
t/collegeinfo/docs/annualrevi
ew_2006.pdf 
University of 
Edinburgh 
BP Contract 
research 
“Eight organisations have already joined the consortium, 
contributing over £400,000 towards studentships and 
research projects. These organisations include significant 
players in the energy sector, such as: ARUP; BP; E-ON; 
Schlumberger; Scottish and Southern Energy; Scottish 
Power; and Shell, as well as Scotland’s regional 
development agency, Scottish Enterprise.” 
Infinite, Annual Review 
of Research and 
Commercialisation at the 
University of Edinburgh, 
Issue 6 (2007) 
http://www.research-
innovation.ed.ac.uk/informat
ion/Infinite2007.pdf 
University of 
Greenwich 
Pfizer Collaborative 
research 
“Current collaborations involve the London School of 
Pharmacy, Imperial College London and various 
industrial companies, including Pfizer and new spin-off 
companies such as Toximet Ltd and Ilika Technologies 
Ltd.” 
School of Science, Guide 
to Research and 
Enterprise, University of 
Greenwich (2008) 
http://www.gre.ac.uk/__data
/assets/pdf_file/0020/173522
/Research-2008.pdf 
University of 
Leeds 
Network Rail Consultancy “Dr Andrew Smith is working with the Office for Rail 
Regulation (ORR) and Britain’s rail infrastructure 
provider, Network Rail, to benchmark the efficiency 
performance of Network Rail against the organisation’s 
counterparts in twelve European countries.” 
Impact. Research and 
Innovation at the 
University of Leeds, 
Issue 3, Summer 2008 
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/impa
ct/impact08.pdf 
University of 
Sheffield 
Qinetiq Collaborative 
research 
“The team are working closely with the Home Office 
and the UK Border Agency to ensure the device meets 
their needs. QinetiQ, a leading international defence and 
security technology company, is working in partnership 
with our researchers to address the human factors and 
understand how users will interact with the robots.” 
U-Inspire - Knowledge 
Transfer Newsletter, 
Issue 4, Summer 2008, 
University of Sheffield 
http://www.shef.ac.uk/conte
nt/1/c6/08/61/33/uinspire4.p
df 
 
35 
 
Appendix Table 2: Number of identified interactions between universities and large R&D-
intensive firms  
Region (Number of universities) Same Region Interactions 
Different Regions 
Interactions 
East Midlands (9)  15  116 
East of England (9)  37  121 
London (39)  98  215 
North East (5)  24  38 
Northern Ireland (2)  3  19 
North West (13)  41  80 
Scotland (15)  37  95 
South East (17)  65  91 
South West (13)  24  92 
Wales (11)  8  44 
West Midlands (12)  21  88 
Yorkshire and the Humber (11)  18  70 
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Appendix Table 3: Data descriptives for regression analysis (N=156) 
  Mean S.D. 
Dependent variable   
 Research grants and contracts from industry (mean average of 2008–09, 2009–10, and 2010–11, thousand £) 1833.23 3605.86 
 Research grants and contracts from industry (weighted average of 2008–09, 2009–10, and 2010–11, thousand £) 1807.83 3510.07 
University internal characteristics   
 FTI employment (thousand) 1.91 1.78 
 (FTI employment)2 (million) 6.80 12.95 
 Active patents (thousand) 0.06 0.16 
 ‘Old’ universities affiliated with Russell Group (dummy) 0.13 0.34 
 ‘Old’ universities not affiliated with Russell Group (dummy) 0.33 0.47 
 Medical specialisation (dummy) 0.03 0.16 
Regional environment   
 Aggregated regional number of firms interacting with universities 82.73 44.37 
 Aggregated regional amount of R&D investment made by interacting firms (billion £) 34.24 23.22 
 East Midlands (dummy) 0.06 0.23 
 East of England (dummy) 0.06 0.23 
 North East (dummy) 0.03 0.18 
 Northern Ireland (dummy) 0.02 0.11 
 North West (dummy) 0.08 0.28 
 Scotland (dummy) 0.10 0.30 
 South East (dummy) 0.11 0.31 
 South West (dummy) 0.08 0.28 
 Wales (dummy) 0.07 0.26 
 West Midlands (dummy) 0.08 0.27 
 Yorkshire and the Humber (dummy) 0.07 0.26 
University interactions with large R&D-intensive firms   
 Number of interactions with firms 9.36 16.15 
 R&D expenditures of firms interacting (billion £) 5.23 9.94 
 Structural Holes 0.55 0.43 
 Average of crow-fly distances with firms outside the university’s region (thousand miles) 0.08 0.09 
Lagged dependent variable   
 Research grants and contracts from industry (mean average of 2003–04 and 2004–05, thousand £) 1575.56 3359.39 
 Research grants and contracts from industry (mean average of 1999–2000 and 2000–01, thousand £) 1588.98 3009.49 
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Appendix Figure 1: Illustrative example of variations in the value of the composite of degree 
centrality and eigenvector centrality (Burt’s measure of constraint) – see note overleaf 
 
Example 1 
 ( ) 101 2 =+  
  
 
 
 
 
Example 2 
 ( ) ( ) 5.005.005.0 22 =+++  
  
 
 
 
 
Example 3 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 63.05.05.0005.005.0 222 =×+++++  
 
 
 
 
 
Example 4 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 56.033.05.00
33.05.0005.005.0
2
222
=×++
×+++++
 
  
 
 
 
Example 5 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 55.025.05.0025.05.00
25.05.0005.005.0
22
222
=×++×++
×+++++
 
  
 
  
 
Example 6 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 33.0033.0033.0033.0 222 =+++++  
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Note to Appendix Figure 1: 
To illustrate this composite measure of centrality, Appendix Figure 1 provides a set of 
examples showing variations in centrality based on the values of Burt’s constraint measure. 
By definition, the value of centrality is determined by the number of firms a focal university 
interacts with directly and the number of other universities those firms interact with directly. 
In each example, four universities—U1, U2, U3, and U4—and three firms—F1, F2, and F3—
are considered, although not all of them are connected. The value of centrality concerns U1. 
In example 1, U1 interacts with one firm, F1, whilst in examples 2 to 5 the university 
interacts with two firms and in example 6 with three firms. As can be seen, the value of 
centrality varies with the number of interactions a university has with firms. Its value declines 
as the university interacts with a greater number of firms, as is evident by comparing 
examples 1, 2, and 6. Furthermore, the value also varies with the connectivity of firms the 
university interacts with. By comparing examples 2 to 5, it is evident that in each case U1 has 
two interactions with firms; however, the centrality value is different due to one firm, F2, 
possessing links to additional universities (U2, U3 and U4). 
 
